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The Politicisation of Security: Controversy, Mobilisation, Arena Shifting  
Introduction by the Guest Editors 
Jonas Hagmann, Hendrik Hegemann and Andrew Neal 
Introduction 
Security is often seen as a special kind of politics, given its apparent tendency to close down 
public debate, rely on exclusive expert knowledge, and empower exceptional measures.1 
However, recent empirical developments have challenged these assumptions. There has always 
been periodically intense political activity around security, especially in relation to temporary 
spikes in public debates and clashes related to the use of military force, large-scale military 
spending or highly-publicised security and intelligence scandals. Yet, with the widening and 
deepening of what it means to speak ‘security’ and the increasing value that states and societies 
attach to the concept, security themes have become more prominent in a wide range of political 
activities and arenas, including the agendas of parliaments, courts, and NGOs. These have 
become more vividly debated by parties, civil society groups, newspapers and broadcasters, 
and are given increasingly polarised and viral spins on social media platforms. For example, 
parliaments in many countries have published reports and held inquiries on some of the more 
controversial aspects of the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’, such as ‘enhanced interrogation’ or the 
‘blacklisting’ of terrorist suspects. The revelations by Edward Snowden on mass surveillance 
by Western intelligence agencies led to intensive public debates. European courts at different 
levels have ruled against new laws for the retention of telecommunications data and the transfer 
of passenger name records. In the United States, President Trump’s executive order of the 
‘Muslim travel ban’ ignited intense public protests at airports and elsewhere. At the same time, 
many right-wing populist movements have also challenged security elites, arguing that security 
authorities were not doing enough, rather than too much. These latter usually demand even 
harsher security measures, including the targeting of minority groups. This is part of a broader 
                                                 
1 Claudia Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation”, Journal of 
International Relations and Development 7, no. 4 (2004): 388-413; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Jef Huysmans, Security Unbound: 
Enacting Democratic Limits (London: Routledge, 2014); Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous 
Symbol”, Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1952): 481-502. 
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trend. Security has been a central and controversial concern in recent elections, including in 
Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, and during the ‘Brexit’ referendum. Beyond 
such political drama, a growing range of diverse actors now deal with security on a regular 
basis, for example in parliamentary committee work or public consultation processes, thereby 
resembling familiar patterns of ‘normal’ democratic politics seen in other policy-fields.  
These observations go against the accepted scholarly understanding that security is 
necessarily a domain of sovereign decision, professional prerogative or control technology that 
marginalises more ‘normal’ forms of (democratic) politics. Earlier research in Political Science 
and Public Policy had occasionally flagged up the potential link between security and wider 
political debates and processes, such as the extent of parliamentary control on military 
deployments,2 the influence of public opinion and protests during the Cold War,3 or the local, 
national and international political economies of defence procurement.4 However, these debates 
remained marginal, and studies tended to focus on ‘traditional’ issues of national security and 
did not engage with wider conceptual discussions about ‘security’ and its political effects. 
Among security studies researchers there is a strong understanding that, generally speaking, 
security narratives have powerful effects on political and social life; weighing the normative 
components of observed security politics, many contemporary security scholars equate security 
with inevitable constraints on democratic politics, public debate and political struggle.5 In this 
sense, security as a dominant framing is, by and large, considered a problem for, or even 
removed from, democratic politics. As a consequence of this scholarly view, surprisingly few 
studies exist today on how security articulations are or can be contested, engaged across 
different political arenas, and taken up by diverse political actors, such as courts, parliaments, 
NGOs and individual political leaders.6 Taking a cue from empirical developments and 
focusing on European contexts, this special issue seeks to draw attention to a broader universe 
of actors, arguments and arenas of security politics that extend beyond securitised exceptions, 
                                                 
2 William G. Howell and John C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War 
Powers, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
3 Paul Burstein and William Freudenberg, “Changing Public Policy: The Impact of Public Opinion, Antiwar 
Demonstrations, and War Costs on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Motions”, American Journal of Sociology 84, 
no. 11 (1978): 99-122. 
4 Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, “Public Opinion and the Common Defence: Who Governs Military 
Spending in the United States?”, American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (1992): 905-915. 
5 Buzan et al., Security; Ole Wæver, “Politics, Security, Theory”, Security Dialogue 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 465-80; 
Huysmans, Security Unbound; Michael Williams, “Securitization as Political Theory: The Politics of the 
Extraordinary”, International Relations 29, no. 1 (2015): 114-120.   




technocratic risk management or executive prerogatives. Rather than focusing on the diverse 
ways in which security limits politics, the contributors address the varied forms and modes of 
politics that increasingly emerge in and around security. Instead of looking at security as 
closure, we propose an understanding of security as a field of political activity occupied by 
diverse actors mobilised in different kinds of struggles, and in which political conflicts can shift 
across arenas. Seen this way, political closure might be one possible outcome, but it should not 
simply be presumed and taken for granted.   
In order to capture a broader range of political controversy, activity, and actors linked 
to security, this special issue suggests using the conceptual vocabulary of politicisation, rather 
than traditional security studies concepts such as securitisation, governmentality or control. In 
so doing, it connects security studies to political studies literatures often ignored by the subfield 
– especially research on politicisation and de-politicisation in liberal democracies7 and on the 
politicisation of international institutions and European governance8 – and explores their utility 
for analysing current security-related political phenomena. Taken together, the politicisation 
perspective advanced by this special issue thus endeavours to make three contributions to 
current theoretical, empirical and normative debates on security politics: First, it seeks to 
reopen conceptual questions about the relationship between security and politics. 
Acknowledging the historical legacy of ‘security’ as domain of sovereign decision, influential 
critiques of national security as a tool of social and political exclusion, and the expansion of 
security governance technologies and expertise, it foregrounds overlooked developments of 
increasing and diversifying political activity around security. Rather than starting from security 
studies perspectives emphasising the marginalisation of politics by security, it points to the 
literature on politicisation as alternative vantage points for analysing recent dynamics in the 
security field. Second, it aims to empower original and contextualising empirical work. Apart 
                                                 
7 Matthew Flinders and Jim Buller, “Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools”, British Politics 1 no. 3 
(2006): 293-318; Colin Hay, Why We Hate Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Matthew Wood, “Politicisation, 
Depoliticisation and Anti-politics: Towards a Multilevel Research Agenda”, Political Studies Review 14, no. 4 
(2016): 521-533.  
8 Pieter de Wilde, “No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European 
Integration”, Journal of European Integration 33, no. 5 (2011): 559-75; Pieter de Wilde, Anna Leupold and 
Henning Schmidtke, “Introduction: The Differentiated Politicisation of European Governance”, West European 
Politics 39, no. 1 (2016): 3-22; Edgar Grande and Swen Hutter, “Introduction: European Integration and the 
Challenge of Politicisation”, in Politicising Europe: Integration and Mass Politics, eds. Swen Hutter, Edgar 
Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3-31; Hanspeter Kriesi, “The 
Politicization of European Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (Annual Review 2016): 32-47; 
Michael Zürn, “The Politicization of World Politics and its Effects: Eight Propositions”, European Political 
Science Review 6, no. 1 (2014): 47-71.  
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from the question of whether security is politicised or not, we need to understand when, why, 
how and by whom security is made more controversial, opened to debate by different actors, 
and shifted to different political arenas. Third, the politicisation perspective seeks to de-centre 
the focus from an a priori view on security as a loss of democratic ideals; ideals that are often 
presupposed and yearned for, but whose precise past and potential configurations are rarely 
investigated in detail (and are sometimes quite romanticised). Rather, it calls for more 
differentiated inquiries into the ambivalent consequences and normative implications of 
politicisation in its different guises, which cannot simply be presumed to be a normatively 
preferable option.  
To these aims, the introduction first summarises existing arguments that tend to 
associate security with depoliticisation. It then draws on different approaches from political 
science to develop a framework for the study of politicisation in the security field emphasising 
three aspects: controversiality, mobilisation, and arena-shifting. These dimensions are 
illustrated with brief case studies on public controversies surrounding the revelations by Edward 
Snowden, the mobilisation of lay publics in the making of national security strategies, and 
parliaments as an arena of ‘normal’ security politics. The introduction concludes with a short 
preview of the special issue’s six research articles and their contributions to the analysis of 
security and politics. 
 
Security versus Politics: The Depoliticisation Argument 
Contemporary security analysis often links security to strategies of depoliticisation. 
Depoliticisation essentially refers to processes that seek to deny the political character of a topic 
and move the issue out of the realm of contingent and controversial discussion.9 Depoliticisation 
itself is a deeply political act that can be contested and reversed, but, if established as a dominant 
narrative, can shape and constrain the political process. Though security has always been 
political, it is often seen as placing a constraint on democratic politics that stifles public debate 
and political contestation and limits the range of legitimate arenas, actors and arguments. Jef 
Huysmans, a leading contemporary security studies scholar, goes as far as defining the very 
                                                 
9 Peter Burnham, “New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation”, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 3, no. 2 (2001), 128; Hay, Politics, 79-80. 
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essence of security as ‘techniques enacting democratic limits’.10 Security in this sense is linked 
to depoliticisation – which in the specialised literatures comes in different variants, or traditions. 
The most deeply engrained view in this regard is represented by theories of self-
proclaimed ‘realism’. Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan had already cast a shadow over the security 
concept and its field of practice, placing sovereign guarantees of existential security as 
fundamentally prior to other human concerns, including politics. Even today, this is reflected 
in the disciplinary heritage of the concept of security, which is more at home in the field of 
International Relations than in domestic or comparative politics. For much of the twentieth 
century, security in the ‘realist’ tradition was considered the domain of sovereign states and 
commanders-in-chief. Here, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international politics were not to 
be the realms of public debate, democratic deliberation, or political choice; they were too 
important for that. Martin Wight, for instance, suggested that ‘International politics…is the field 
in which political action is most regularly necessitous’,11 and Max Weber maintained that 
‘foreign policy deliberations which are still in the balance…must be dealt with in a small 
committee protected by a guarantee of confidentiality’.12  
This long-standing line of ‘traditionalist’ and ‘realist’ reasoning, according to which 
extraordinary politics dominates in the security realm, and security is a prerogative of the state 
in its attempt to guarantee national security and survival, is still present in contemporary 
security studies theorising – albeit for different reasons. Most famously maybe, the 
‘Copenhagen School’ of securitisation argued that constructions of existential threat – if 
accepted by the target audience – can legitimate extraordinary measures and shield them from 
public scrutiny and deliberation. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde famously defined 
acts of securitisation as ‘the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game 
and frames the issue as either a special kind of politics or as above politics’.13 Hence, 
invocations of security enact a specific logic of exception and urgency in politics that favours 
speedy decision-making, strengthens governmental authority and impedes open resistance.14 
Driven by securitising actors and operating mainly through the power of language, security 
                                                 
10 Huysmans, Security Unbound, 13. 
11 Martin Wight, “Why Is There No International Theory?”, in: International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. 
James der Derian (London: Macmillan, 1995), 26. 
12 Max Weber, “Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order”, in: Weber: Political 
Writings, eds. Max Weber, Peter Lassmann and Ronald Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
185-6. 
13 Buzan et al., Security, 23. 
14 Williams, “Securitization”.  
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articulations are thus principally at odds with democratic politics.15 In foundational ‘realist’ and 
‘Copenhagen’ understandings alike, security is thus prior to politics in the sense of being its 
condition of possibility, above politics in the sense of the Leviathan towering above the realm, 
and beyond politics in the sense of being international and not domestic. Security of course 
remains political, but it is prior, above, and beyond the ‘low’ politics of non-existential matters. 
However, this statist model of security has been subjected to important criticism. In 
1992, arguing from a feminist perspective, J. Ann Tickner pointed out that ‘national security 
often takes precedence over the social security of individuals’.16 David Campbell, and others 
influenced by post-structuralism, argued that far from simply defending the ‘nation’ against 
foreign enemies, such strategies also ‘operated as a means of domesticating the (US) self’ and 
as an ‘intolerance for ambiguity at all levels of social life from neighbourhoods to the 
international order’.17 Such critiques and the search for ethico-political alternatives have found 
a long and productive life in feminist and critical security studies. These critiques are 
themselves a form of politicisation, highlighting the deleterious and marginalising political 
effects of security policies and practices with a view to encouraging alternatives. But while this 
is a long-established move in critical security studies, our point of departure is that this 
argument needs readdressing in order to note the flourishing of political activities around 
security that belie the assumption of depoliticisation.  
This also applies to more recent scholarship focusing on security ‘governance’ and 
politics beyond the domain of sovereign decision and international affairs. Scholars in Critical 
Security Studies and International Political Sociology especially have mapped out and theorised 
the expansion of security governance as a field of technology and expertise along the 
domestic/international distinction. ‘Security’ in this sense is not a constraint of politics through 
dramatic speech acts and exceptional measures, but rather through mundane yet inaccessible 
bureaucratic routines in the management of everyday insecurity and diffuse risks. These are 
spurred by the new reliance on modern data capture technologies and transnational information 
exchange, i.e. high degrees of professionalisation and executive inter-agency cooperation 
                                                 
15 Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene“; Lene Hansen, “Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The 
Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It”, Review of International 
Studies 38 , no. 4 (2011): 525-546. 
16 J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New 
York: Columbia University Press), 28. 
17 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 270, 277. 
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across borders and a wide range of themes.18 Under these conditions, political conflict and 
debate are limited to behind-the-scenes considerations between hard-to-find ‘security 
professionals’ of all sorts, who enjoy special authority and whose knowledge production and 
negotiation practices are difficult to read and challenge by lay persons.19 Moreover, security is 
at times also portrayed as disempowering by virtue of its ‘technological operation’. In the view 
of control scholars especially, modern security instruments such as CCTV cameras, sensors, 
databases or classification algorithms are found to act on society, not in dialogue with it.20 
Security seen this way works in ‘gazing’ and machine-like ways, imposing itself on the body 
politic. Designed environments, programmed machines and installed technologies normalise 
societal behaviour in ways that are difficult to escape or even detect, and almost impossible to 
speak back to.21  
Scholars have analysed the rise of security technologies such as visa databases, online 
tracking and surveillance systems, algorithmic risk management, and border regimes when 
making these claims. Much like the feminist and post-structuralist critiques mentioned earlier, 
these scholars and cases continue to convey concerns about the priority of security over politics. 
Didier Bigo, for example, writes that this growing field of security professionals has simply 
'discarded some actors, like parliaments'.22 Jonas Hagmann and Myriam Dunn-Cavelty, writing 
about the rise of science-oriented ‘national risk registers’, argue that they ‘foreclose the 
possibility of contestation and discount alternative views’.23 Similarly, Claudia Aradau and 
Rens van Munster suggest that risk governance technologies do not ‘lead to a democratic 
politics that debates what is to be done, but to intensified efforts and technological inventions 
on the part of the risk managers’.24 Again, while these critiques of technological and 
professional security developments attempt to repoliticise them, they can and often do overlook 
                                                 
18 Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”, Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 27 (2002): 64-92. 
19 Trine Villumsen Berling, “Science and Securitization: Objectivation, the Authority of the Speaker and 
Mobilization of Scientific Facts”, Security Dialogue 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 385-397; Jonas Hagmann and Myriam 
Dunn Cavelty, “National Risk Registers: Security Scientism and the Propagation of Permanent Insecurity”, 
Security Dialogue 43, no. 1 (2012): 80-97. 
20 Jonas Hagmann, “Security in the Society of Control: The Politics and Practices of Securing Urban Spaces”, 
International Political Sociology 11, no. 4 (2017): 418-448; Michael Hardt, “The Global Society of Control”, 
Discourse 20, no. 3 (1998): 139-152. 
21 David Lyon, Surveillance after Snowden (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); Jef Huysmans, “Democratic Curiosity in 
Times of surveillance. European Journal of International Security 1(1): 73-93. 
22 Bigo, “Security“, 83. 
23 Hagmann and Dunn Cavelty, “Risk Registers“, 81. 
24 Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, 
(Un)Knowing the Future, European Journal o f International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 108. 
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the proliferation of political actors and activities that are already doing so, such as the cyber 
activists increasingly mobilised against electronic state surveillance practices. 
By ‘security’ then, we refer to three dimensions of specialised thinking and practice, 
and note that they each convey deleterious implications for politics. First, we refer to the still-
powerful historical and conceptual legacy that posits the sovereign state guarantee of ‘security’ 
as the necessary condition for social, political, and economic life. This is often associated with 
‘hard’ security issues such as war, secret intelligence, and military affairs.25 Second, we refer 
to ‘security’ as a site of contest and political struggle, because for at least three decades the 
paradigm of ‘national security’ has been criticised for not addressing and even exacerbating the 
insecurities of vulnerable groups, such as women and minorities, and those whose basic human 
needs are not met by prevailing socio-economic conditions.26 And third, we refer to security as 
a growing field of governance practices that are increasingly bureaucratised, decentralised, 
privatised, and technologised, which spill beyond traditional foreign security policy and into 
the myriad social interactions and economic transactions that permeate globalised life.27 
Common to all three themes, we find, is an assumption (in the first case) or an anxiety (in the 
second and third) that ‘security’ trumps ‘politics’ because of its existential priority, institutional 
predominance and lengthening technological tendrils.  
Our thumbnail sketches of existing current security studies arguments only scratch the 
surface of by now much wider and more complex scholarly debates. However, they do illustrate 
that despite their differences, major traditions in contemporary security studies share a basic 
emphasis on the depoliticising effects of security. There has been a move towards more refined 
contextualisation of the things security ‘does’ politically, i.e., wider acknowledgement that 
‘security does different things at different times and in different places’.28 Also, there has been 
a move towards understanding its mechanism of enactment and reproduction in more dialectical 
                                                 
25 Patrick A. Mello and Dirk Peters, “Parliaments in Security Policy: Involvement, Politicisation, and Influence”, 
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 1 (2018), 5; see also: Stephen M. Walt, “The 
Renaissance of Security Studies”, International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 1991), 211-39. 
26 Christopher S. Browning and Matt McDonald, “The Future of Critical Security Studies. Ethics and the Politics 
of Security”, European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 2 (2013), 242; Heidi Hudson, “Doing Security 
as Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Security”, Security Dialogue 
36, no. 2 (2005): 155-74.  
27 Marieke de Goede, Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Money (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012); Nick Vaughan-Williams, Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
28 Browning and McDonald, “Critical Security Studies”, 242; see also: Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of 
Securitization: Political Agenda, Audience and Context”, European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 
(2005): 171-201..  
 9 
 
and contingent ways.29 Yet while the second and third of these strands have explicitly sought 
to (re)politicise the depoliticisations of security through critique, they have done so largely 
without consideration of the proliferating forms of political activity that surround security 
policy and practice. Most research still coalesces around the notion that discourses and practices 
of security ‘are part of a disciplining power that constitutes a separation between security and 
the political, which severely constrains and limits the space of political contention’.30 
 
Politics around Security: The Politicisation Perspective 
This special issue does not suggest that the constraining (and unwarranted) effects of security 
on political debate and conflict described above do not exist. Yet, it argues that security politics 
should not be reduced to securitised exception, professional risk-management and technological 
control, which only cover parts of the various political activities around security in its different 
guises. Indeed, these framings make it difficult to address seemingly more recent observations 
such as public court activism, parliamentary efforts at (re-)claiming security affairs, or 
individual politicians’ and governments’ own attempts at politicising security topics. Instead of 
entangling itself in the now vast debate on the conceptual revision and methodological 
refinement of ‘securitisation’ or other established prime concepts in security studies, such as 
emancipation, exception, technocracy, governmentality or resilience, this special issue argues 
that politicisation offers an alternative and productive perspective to capture a range of recent 
phenomena in the security field that move beyond the understanding of security as 
depoliticisation.  
Debates on politicisation and depoliticisation in Political Science and European Studies 
are particularly useful for carving out this alternative perspective.  In Political Science, a range 
of scholars deal with forms of depoliticisation in the context of neoliberalism, post-democracy 
and anti-politics. Mostly located in the UK, their recent body of work conceptualises and tracks 
down processes of depoliticisation as well as counter-attempts at (re-)politicisation in this 
                                                 
29 Jonas Hagmann, “Representations of Terrorism and the Making of Counterterrorism Policy”, Critical Studies 
on Terrorism 6, no. 3 (2013): 429-446; Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and 
Beyond”, European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (2007): 357-383. 
30 Karen Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security, Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 5. 
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distinctive polity.31 In International Relations and European Studies, by contrast, a strand of 
recent scholarship has come to focus on how the transfer of authority to international 
institutions, most notably the European Union, as well as the latter’s increasing interference in 
domestic affairs and citizens’ daily lives, has led to intensified societal interest and demands 
that put their legitimacy up for debate. The scholarship here has shown how this trend of societal 
politicisation questions established forms of functional legitimation, and challenges the alleged 
‘permissive consensus’ among internationalist elites with ambivalent consequences for 
international cooperation, as is visible in protests during international summits, responses to the 
‘Eurocrisis’ and indeed Brexit.32 
What brings these two bodies of literature together is an understanding that politicisation 
accentuates the deliberation and contestation of alternative viewpoints in the public sphere, and 
that it can do so along different avenues, as multiple actors contribute to putting established 
assumptions up for debate. Politicisation in this sense opens up or expands the scope of political 
conflict to include a broader variety of actors, audiences and arguments. This follows a conflict-
oriented understanding of politics that emphasises contingency and the struggle over 
collectively binding decisions. Politics, hence, is described as ‘a generative, indeterminate 
process, which is inherently unstable, complex, value-laden, contested and, ultimately, 
concerned with agency’.33 Politicisation is the process of transferring issues into the political 
sphere, but also the dynamic of reconfiguring its handling there. It moves issues from simple 
necessities to which there is no alternative to contingent and multi-faceted struggles over 
alternative options. It thereby creates space for political action.34  
Politicisation is a useful concept for the study of the relationship between security and 
politics. It offers a vector for addressing the seemingly new, or now more visible, political 
activities around security described in the introduction, and refrain from making ‘simple’ 
dichotomous distinctions. This is because specific (de-) politicisation boosts can move an issue 
in either direction along a continuum, and in many cases different actors will try to move issues 
                                                 
31 Burnham “Politics of Depoliticisation”; Paul Fawcett and David Marsh, “Depoliticisation, Governance and 
Political Participation”, Policy & Politics 42,  no. 2 (2014): 171-188; Flinders and Wood, “Depoliticisation”; 
Hay, Politics; Laura Jenkins, “The Difference Genealogy Makes: Strategies for Politicisation or How To Expand 
Capacities for Autonomy”, Political Studies 59 no. 1 (2011); Bob Jessop, “Repoliticising Depoliticisation: 
Theoretical Preliminaries on Some Responses to the American Fiscal and Eurozone Debt Crises”, Policy & 
Politics 42, no. 2 (2014): 207-23; Wood, “Politicisation”. 
32 De Wilde “Politicization of European Integration”; de Wilde et al., “Differentiated Politicisation”; Grande and 
Hutter, “Introduction”; Kriesi, “Politicisation”; Zürn, “Politicization of World Politics”. 
33 Jenkins, “Strategies for Politicisation”, 159. 
34 Hay, Politics, 67. 
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in very different directions.35 A politicisation perspective directs us to trace and unpack these 
very processes in order to understand how concrete actors advance their potentially conflicting 
arguments and interact in various arenas. Considering politicisation as ‘a set of interrelated 
processes in which human interaction is central’,36 it opens up views on differentiated processes 
as they take form in different thematic, cultural and institutional contexts. In a sense, this special 
issue thereby picks up earlier research in Political Science and Public Policy that, as mentioned 
in the introduction, studied a range of political activities around security and defence policy. 
However, we focus more specifically on the processes through which security issues in a wider 
sense are made political and brought into the realm of controversial and contingent public 
debate and decision-making. In order to study the diverse manifestations of politicisation in the 
security field, we look to the aforementioned literature on the politicisation of international 
institutions, where authors often identify three interrelated (and sometimes also difficult to 
delineate) indicators to determine different kinds and degrees of politicisation: the level of 
polarisation and contestation across different actors and their opinions; the salience and 
visibility of an issue to the public; and the range and diversity of actors that is active and 
interested in the field.37 Building upon this distinction, this special issue argues that 
politicisation processes in the security field entail changes at three distinct levels: issues 
becoming more divisive or controversial; actors becoming more aware and politically engaged; 
and the shifting of security themes and issues from executive secrecy or expert specialisms into 
more prominent public arenas.  
Our first dimension of controversy stresses that politicisation is a contentious, 
interactive process in which various political actors make competing claims over which they 
struggle with the targets of their demands and broader audiences. Controversy increases when 
more diverse, conflicting or even extreme viewpoints on an issue find their way into public 
discourse and the growing distance between opinions held and voiced by various actors or 
groups becomes visible. It is, hence, a measure for the ‘intensity of conflict’.38 Respective 
empirical research, for example, traces changes in political polarisation as expressed in party 
platforms, media reporting, public opinion polls or parliamentary debates. In addition, 
                                                 
35 Hendrik Hegemann and Martin Kahl, “(Re-)Politisierung der Sicherheit? Legitimation und Kontestation 
geheimdienstlicher Überwachung nach Snowden“, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 23, no. 2 (2016) 
37.  
36 Pieter de Wilde, Politicisation of European Integration: Bringing the Process into Focus (Oslo: Arena, 2007), 
19. 
37 de Wilde et al., “Differentiated Politicisation”, 4; Grande and Hutter, “Introduction”, 8. 
38 Grande and Hutter, “Introduction”, 9. 
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controversy is not limited to diverging statements in the public sphere, but can also manifest 
itself in symbolic actions or protests that challenge specific views. In this sense, politicisation 
relates to the tradition of ‘contentious politics’, where scholars have intensively studied how 
different actors make and advance competing claims on various social and political issues.39 
They usually focus on social movements that challenge government policies, but these 
‘contentious interactions’ might also involve additional participants from different 
backgrounds. Controversies can target specific political decisions, but can also attack broader 
political orders, including the question of which issues are to be considered political and who 
should decide on that. For example, critics of liberalism and neoliberalism have railed against 
market-favouring policies that attempt to depoliticise and naturalise iniquitous socio-economic 
conditions.40  
Security is often described as being driven by an elite consensus that pushes through 
security measures. However, a closer look reveals that many security policies are subject to 
contentious and intense debates that cut across various political camps, including not only 
challenges to government policies but also diverging opinions among different societal groups. 
In many cases contested policies might not eventually change, but it is still evident that it is 
misleading to regard security as distinct from contentious politics and as purely controlled by 
political elites. A pertinent example is the debate on border security in the European Union. 
Like European security more broadly, observers tended to characterise border security as a 
rather technical issue left to specialised agencies, such as Frontex (now European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency), or new technological systems of border control, such as Eurosur.41 
Border security, however, has gained importance and political visibility since the second half 
of the 2000s due to increased irregular migration and the growing numbers of refugees. 
Especially with the recent miseries experienced by migrants crossing the Mediterranean and the 
political handling of this situation the attention devoted to issues of border protection rocketed 
to new heights. The seemingly technocratic Frontex became the subject of intense political 
criticism, both from the left and right.42 Demands ranged from a more humane approach, and a 
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focus on rescue missions in the Mediterranean over calls for stepped up protection of the EU’s 
external borders, to calls for re-nationalisation in order to ‘take back control’. While a range of 
political actors and parties, such as right-wing populists, clearly benefitted from this debate, 
European leaders could no longer contain the conflict within the established means of 
negotiation and mediation. Comparable patterns can be observed in other cases, such as debates 
about drone strikes or the revelations by Edward Snowden (see below).  
Second, politicisation requires mobilisation of and awareness for an issue among a 
broader audience. Politicisation depends not only on the polarisation or intensity of a conflict, 
but also a reaching beyond narrow circles of ‘usual suspects’ in governments, parliaments or 
think tanks. Conflicts within administrations about budgets or responsibilities, for example, can 
be highly contentious, but they do not necessarily qualify as substantial politicisation as long 
as they take place behind the scenes.43 Politicisation can manifest itself in moving issues that 
were previously considered to be beyond the reach of political control and debate into the realm 
of ‘normal’ and often seemingly mundane politics. For example, in many countries the work of 
intelligence agencies was for a long time – particularly during the Cold War – seen as a special 
case that was by necessity beyond the reach of parliamentary control and public responsibility. 
In recent years, many parliaments have created or expanded parliamentary oversight bodies or 
initiated inquiries.44 However, politicisation becomes more intense when there is concrete 
political mobilisation by diverse actors using different forms and techniques to make and 
advance their claims. This can range from increased media coverage or public attention to 
public protests or political campaigns.45 
This is especially important as security is often linked to governmental or technocratic 
prerogatives that strengthen officials and experts while marginalising the role of citizens, civil 
society groups, social movements and other alternative actors. When critical accounts of 
security examine this broader range of actors, they often limit them to a role as a more or less 
recalcitrant audience that may force security elites to revise, or in rare cases dismiss certain 
ideas and proposals, but have limited independent power to set the political agenda around 
security themselves.46 Recent trends and experiences call this view into doubt. Security 
                                                 
43 Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah 
Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
44 Hendrik Hegemann, “Toward ‘Normal’ Politics? Security, Parliaments and the Politicization of Intelligence 
Oversight in the German Bundestag”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 1 (2018): 
175-90. 
45 Grande and Hutter, “Introduction”, 8-9. 
46 Balzacq, “Faces of Securitization”, 184-86. 
 14 
 
concerns have been a key, and possibly decisive, issue in many recent votes, from the ‘Brexit’ 
referendum in the UK to the Masseneinwanderungsinitiaitive in Switzerland and elections in 
Netherlands, Germany or Austria. To some extent, one might argue that governing elites or 
populist challengers simply invoked public security needs or perceptions of ‘subjective 
insecurity’ for political gains and to hide deeper social and economic problems. However, many 
citizens now consider security a key issue, and they actively advance their own respective 
narratives that may diverge quite significantly from official security narratives.47 Hence, the 
degree to and kind in which citizens and their views are involved in the policy process matters. 
One area where this becomes apparent is the growing inclusion of citizens and societal groups 
on the making of security strategies (see below).  
Third, politicisation as arena-shifting entails the movement of issues between different 
types of actors and institutional and political settings, for example from technical management 
to ministerial decision, from executive secrecy to parliamentary deliberation, or from elite to 
social media discussion. This form of politicisation concerns the de- and re-politicisation moves 
problematised by scholars such as Peter Burnham48 or Caroline Kuzemko,49 which showed how 
British ministers attempted to divest themselves of policy area responsibility by transferring 
these out to technical agencies (in the case of interest rate setting, for instance), or, conversely, 
how media outlets, think tanks and environmental campaign groups succeeded in pushing other 
topics back onto policy agendas (such as in the case of national energy policy). The institutional 
location of issues – and thus the question of who is handling them, who has responsibility for 
them, and who is holding policymakers to account on them – denotes a specific ‘spatial’ 
differentiation of politicisation. It points to the circumstance that politics often draws on 
interconnections of different political arenas that are themselves characterised by different 
forms and audiences of political action, ranging from executive rule and public deliberation to 
judicial review and popular mobilisation. These arenas are not necessarily catering to the same 
audiences, and they sometimes also compete with each other. State institutions – executive 
governments especially – are historically in the lead in producing security as a public good, and 
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thus tend to dominate other spaces.50 But this is not always the case, and patterns of overlay 
may sometimes also work in other directions.51 
Arena shifts may be the result of manifest controversy, such as in West Germany of the 
1970s and 1980s, when discontent with governmental policy crystallised in a powerful extra-
parliamentary peace movement.52 But it can also occur without obvious controversy and still 
be significant politically. For example, a parliamentary committee may choose to launch an 
independent inquiry on a (security) issue for all sorts of reasons – not only responding to public 
controversy, but perhaps as a routine review of how government policies are working, or 
because of concerns shared between interest or lobby groups and committee members.53 Doing 
so on an issue not previously present in the parliament would represent an arena shift that 
brought an issue into public deliberation, and making parliament – a traditionally ignored arena 
of security politics – a place of rather ‘normal’ security politics, including deliberation, 
oversight and partisan conflict (see below). New and empowered arenas of security politics are 
crucial to the politicisation of security, and they can form considerably more public and 
controversial spaces of discussion than the executive domain. Parliaments, courts and public 
inquiries especially do not only aim to hold established security actors legally accountable. 
They can also serve as places where the security-ness of certain acts (such as ideological 
‘support’ for  terrorists) are thoroughly assessed,54 and operate as sites for the public evaluation, 
(re-)negotiation and contestation of security measures and their legitimacy.55 
The politicisation perspective sketched out above primarily accentuates the empirical 
study of politicisation processes along these three dimensions, but it also carries normative 
implications. Scholars in critical security studies have struggled with the question of which 
‘type of politics we want’.56 While there has been a debate about when and how securitisation 
might be a desirable option, for example to mobilise all resources in situations of ‘real’ 
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existential threats,57 there has been a general tendency to discard security logics because they 
were linked to constraints on democratic politics as discussed above. In turn, there was a general 
tendency to call for politicisation, whether in favour of ‘normal’ democratic politics of regular 
institutionalised procedures and public deliberation or more emancipatory versions of radical 
or ‘agonistic’ politics, which would usually require prior desecuritisation.58 Yet, the perspective 
advanced in this special issue suggests that the story is more complicated than calling for ‘less 
security, more politics’.59 Instead of stabilising security as an incessantly exclusive kind of 
politics, and projecting a vision of democratic good life onto either a ‘pre-securitisation’ era or 
a ‘post-securitisation’ era still to come, politicisation approaches offer analytical leverage to 
identify ways in which pushes and pulls for inclusion in security politics already exist today – 
while also questioning the kinds of potentially ambivalent political orders, dynamics, and 
consequences that they might produce. It may well be the case that security needs some degree 
of ‘civilisation’ as a democratically controlled public good that allows for democratic control 
and open deliberation.60 Yet, politicisation – or specific versions thereof – is not per se 
preferable or normatively desirable under all circumstances and in all respects; for example, 
those who are most insecure are often the least heard in public controversies that put their rights 
up for debate,61 and so it remains open whether politicisation would best serve their needs. 
However, this special issue also shows that security and politics are not mutually exclusive, and 
that the presence of ‘security’ in political discourses does not necessarily shut down political 
contingency, activity or agency. Hence, to have a more differentiated understanding of whether 
and when the politicisation of security is a normatively desirable alternative or something more 
ambiguous we need to examine respective processes carefully with regard to their diverse 
forms, consequences and contexts. 
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Trajectories of Politicisation: Empirical Illustrations 
As is the case with established security studies frameworks, the problematisations of 
politicisation found in Political Science and European Studies are guided by concerns with 
political inclusion, contingency and transparency. Yet as the previous discussion shows, the 
latter offer different analytical avenues to, and thus also original empirical work on what it 
means to make security more widely and controversially debated. This is because apart from 
the question of whether security is politicised or not, it suggests a need to understand when, 
why and through what kinds of tactics security is made more controversial, opened to debate 
by different actors and shifted to different political arenas. Looking at the effects of the 
Snowdon revelations, forms of mobilisation in national and urban security strategy-making in 
Switzerland, and arena-shifting and parliamentary politics in the UK, the following mini-case 
studies illustrate concrete trends in the security field that a politicisation perspective can help 
elucidate. Foregrounding one aspect of politicisation each (full case studies would necessarily 
cover the evolution and interplay of all components), they lend weight to the argument that 
‘security’ can become the subject of extensive and controversial political activity in different 
arenas. At the same time, they also illustrate that considerable further work is required before 
the analytical research heuristic set out in this special issue might be narrowed down to isolated 
arguments of causation.  
Controversy: Snowden revelations 
One of the most prominent security controversies of recent years concerns the 
revelations by Edward Snowden and their consequences. In June 2013, media reports, which 
cited Snowden as their source, started to reveal the existence of comprehensive and largely 
classified programs of the US National Security Agency (NSA) and of other Western 
intelligence agencies which were collecting and analysing huge volumes of private 
telecommunications data. Snowden’s revelations kicked off a broad debate about the 
appropriateness of mass surveillance and the work of intelligence agencies more broadly. Media 
outlets around the world reported intensively. Parliaments – for example in the United States 
and Germany – issued reports or established committees of inquiry. Societal groups started 
campaigns and staged protests. Even governments engaged in more or less intense debates 
about the issue, as visible, for example, in the attempt to negotiate a ‘No Spy’ agreement 
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between Germany and the United States as well as in Brazil’s effort to elevate the issue to the 
UN Security Council.  
This case serves to briefly illustrate how the concept of politicisation may help us 
understand the political dynamics of this and other security controversies, which often go 
unnoticed in security and surveillance studies. The security and surveillance studies literature 
usually focuses on the question of how surveillance as a governing technology is used to control 
and manage populations and how it is able to generate a diffuse sense of implicit or explicit 
acceptance, or at least indifference.62 Scholars in this field typically stress that surveillance is 
based on complex and largely invisible technologies, legitimised by drawing attention to salient 
fears of various threats and risks. In addition, many citizens have grown accustomed to handing 
over their personal data, which has become a common element of modern life.63 While these 
approaches typically consider surveillance to be deeply political and remain critical of the 
governance logics that accompany it, they primarily aim to explain the surprising absence of 
political debate and conflict. On first view, the Snowden revelations and the debate that 
followed appear to confirm many of these assumptions. Public protests often focused on the 
‘usual suspects’ of engaged civil rights advocates or online activists and the momentum for 
public action petered out over time. Large parts of the wider public apparently have not adapted 
their communication practices and with new threats of terrorism and migration rising on the 
political agenda reforms of intelligence agencies remained limited and in some cases even 
further extended the surveillance powers of intelligence agencies.  
However, such a perspective tends to overlook important political dynamics that still 
warrant closer scrutiny. For example, the United States Congress held a number of hearings in 
which many top-level officials and experts had to testify on NSA surveillance practices, and 
President Obama commissioned a report by an independent expert committee that came to a 
number of critical conclusion.64 In Germany, the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, 
established a committee of inquiry that heard 89 witnesses and published a final report of nearly 
2,000 pages.65 These practices of review and evaluation may seem rather mundane or even 
technocratic. However, they still provided a forum for the public debate and exchange of 
                                                 
62 Lyon, Surveillance; Huysmans, “Democratic Curiosity”. 
63 Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves et al., “After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance”, 
International Political Sociology 8, no. 2 (2014), 142. 
64 White House, Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of the President’s 
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 12 December 2013. 
65 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses gemäß Artikel 44 
des Grundgesetzes, 18/12850, 23 June 2017. 
 19 
 
conflicting views on the appropriateness of surveillance and publicly unveiled important 
information. They featured statements from different actors representing public and private 
interests and made visible political conflicts, for example through dissenting views along party 
lines. They also forced security actors, including members of the intelligence community, to 
justify their actions which would otherwise hardly reach public attention.66 Snowden and his 
associates released their information bit by bit and kept it on the media agenda for quite some 
time. Many media outlets, such as The Guardian, continued to report critically despite intense 
political pressure, which raised substantial public awareness for an otherwise rather remote 
issue.67 Hence, especially during its early phase, the Snowden debate turned into a high-profile 
global event.  
A politicisation perspective helps us draw attention to, and better understand, such 
security controversies. The Snowden case shows that the security field in some respects remains 
a hard case for political conflict and polarisation, especially when related to societal fears of 
terrorism or other threats, or to often invisible technologies that have become a common feature 
of modern societies. However, decisions and policies are not removed from the more or less 
‘normal’ democratic politics we see in other policy fields, such as parliamentary inquiries, 
media reporting or public protests. Hence, we should not too easily jump to the conclusion that 
the field is governed by an overarching elite consensus that constrains contestation and restricts 
analysis to the mechanisms responsible for this. Rather, the politicisation perspective as defined 
above leads us to study the contentious, multi-actor processes in which different actors struggle 
over the interpretation of events and their consequences.  
Mobilisation: Public participation in governmental security strategy-making  
European security strategies offer interesting cases of politicisation around security, and 
help to highlight the role of mobilisation. Governmental security strategies – whether national, 
urban or international – are authoritative and panoramic statements about the challenges a 
community recognises and the programmatic responses it foresees for their handling.68 As 
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methodologically complex and diplomatically delicate assessments, security strategies were 
traditionally crafted by opaque staff units inside Defence Ministries – especially when security 
was still defined in military terms, and strategy thus included sensitive elements of technology, 
tactics and deployment. Yet their production has become significantly more inclusive and 
transparent since the 1990s in Europe, an observation that raises further questions about 
security’s alleged depoliticised or depoliticising characteristics.  
In Switzerland, for instance, security strategising was opened up by a sequence of 
different factors. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there had been a spectacular societal 
mobilisation around the question of what security policy ought to entail. Threat definitions 
escaped traditional expert circles, as an extra-parliamentary peace movement, the Gruppe 
Schweiz ohne Armee, forced a national vote about the abolition of the armed forces. Although 
rejected, their initiative was supported by over a third of the electorate, and their strong criticism 
of military institutions opened doors for other groupings to participate in subsequent 
elaborations of security policy. By the mid-1990s, further controversies added to this process, 
as globalisation, European integration and the disintegration of the Eastern Block created fault-
lines between internationalists and nationalists. The fundamental parameters of Swiss foreign 
and security policy, which historically rested on a powerful elite consensus on armed neutrality, 
became subject to debate in parliament and among government ministers. This was also 
reflected in a spate of unusually close popular votes in which right-wing politicians mobilised 
particularly successfully through narratives of societal insecurity.69 By the early 2000s, finally, 
discussions turned less controversial in the public arena, but security began to mobilise lower 
levels of government, for the increasing importance of police, civil protection and migration 
agencies demanded inclusion of subnational competencies into the federal security domain.70  
These dynamics helped open up governmental strategy-making processes, and thus 
mobilise wider groupings for the production of security strategy. This is because, as an attempt 
to integrate dissenting perspectives, the latter’s preparation turned into an increasingly more 
iterative, inclusive and transparent activity. Already, the 1996 Brunner Commission, a 
government-mandated consultation committee set up ‘to foster consensus view on security 
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policy’ – brought together 42 individuals from public administration, parliament, media, civil 
society and the private sector to inform the 2000 Swiss security strategy.71 Some years later, 
inclusive discussions around security were built into the official formulation process itself: The 
2010 national security strategy rested on broad consultation inside federal government and drew 
on 45 hearings with political parties, interest groups, cantonal governments, first responders, 
scholars and foreign experts, whose statements were transcribed and uploaded to a moderated 
web-platform. The public was invited to comment on the themes covered through the platform, 
which meant that an unprecedented large lay public was mobilised in the development of the 
nation’s security strategy.72 Extended stakeholder mobilisation also occurred in latest strategy 
process, albeit in reduced form. The development of the 2016 doctrine included 13 expert 
hearings (again published online).73 The building blocks of its text were circulated among all 
federal ministries, cantonal governments, inter-cantonal and municipal executive (police, civil 
protection etc.) entities, the six largest political parties, and 19 business and civil society 
organisations ranging from officers’ associations to unions and industry associations, all of 
which were invited to comment in writing. There was no online platform for citizen 
involvement this time, not least as public and partisan controversy on security themes had 
reduced by that time, but cantonal governments now mobilised strongly behind closed doors, 
for their contributions to national security grew substantially.74 Mobilisation had thus shifted to 
yet another locus and actor category by the 2010s. 
The Swiss example illustrates how security strategising can be made to rest on 
awareness and active, indeed strategic, engagement of increasingly complex sets of actors. It 
shows how evolving kinds of actors can be included in quintessential debates around security, 
the viability and intensity of select dangers and appropriate policy measures. Tellingly, the 
illustration suggests that such processes can evolve across time, and that mobilisation does not 
necessarily require public controversy or consequent arena-shift, such as from government to 
parliament. This is because the described inclusion processes remained, in fact, government-
led throughout. Parliament can still only ‘take note’ of published strategies, as their formulation 
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remains an executive competence. Inclusion in security politics thus remains a voluntary 
governmental policy-making option in Switzerland. And while such democratic 
experimentalism beyond conventional legitimation conduits is power-laden itself, featuring its 
own ambivalences and limitations – such as regarding who choses whom to consult, when, and 
with what effect on strategy writing and its operationalisation – its adoption and increasingly 
routine use does challenge close associations of security with depoliticising decisionism, 
expertise or technology. This holds true also elsewhere in Europe, in Spain, France, Germany, 
Norway, the Netherlands or the Czech Republic, where similar participation frameworks have 
been employed.75 
Arena-Shifting: The role of parliaments  
Parliaments are increasingly active on security. As the key institutional sites of 
democratic politics in liberal democracies, this is significant in the context of the politicisation 
arguments discussed above. If parliamentary activity on security is on the rise, then how should 
we understand this through a politicisation lens? In fact, parliamentary security politics speaks 
to each of the three themes identified in this special issue: parliamentarians invariably respond 
to public controversies, including those concerning security such as intelligence scandals; they 
mobilise around issues by asking questions of the executive, setting up inquiries and calling for 
evidence; and they bring security issues into the public parliamentary arena that were once 
excluded. For example, the national parliaments of the UK, Germany, Canada and Finland 
amongst others have variously held votes on interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria 
in the past two decades, often challenging, testing and even establishing constitutional norms 
on executive war powers in the process.76  
However, it is worth analytically disaggregating our three distinctions between 
controversy, mobilisation and arena-shifting in this case, and focusing on the significance of 
the latter. The insight from the British depoliticisation debate discussed earlier is that the arena 
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or location of issues matters politically; for example, outsourcing the governance of policy 
issues from government to technical agencies is, these scholars argue, a form of 
depoliticisation.77 This parallels the argument found in securitisation theory that security 
removes issues from ‘normal politics’ and elevates them to smaller and less democratic circles 
of decision making.78 Increasing parliamentary activity on security suggests a form of 
politicisation that reverses this process: an arena-shift of security issues into the parliamentary 
arena. While controversies can be a headline example of this, they do not tell the full picture. 
Most of the work that parliaments do is not so high profile. For example, a cursory glance at 
the current activities of the UK parliament reveals more than 100 on-going committee inquiries, 
some of which are responses to public controversy but many of which are not.79 The titles of 
15 of these explicitly relate to security as defined by the current scope of the UK national 
security strategy, including defence, terrorism, cyber-attacks, and humanitarian intervention.80 
If we were to dig in to the content of the rest of the inquiries, such as on migration or border 
management, we would likely find further security relevance. The appearance of security issues 
in the everyday activities of parliament is significant in the context of prevailing assumptions 
about executive dominance of security policy and its depoliticising effects.  
The idea that this represents an ‘arena-shift’ of security into the parliamentary arena is 
clearer if we take a historical perspective. A good illustration is the work of the UK House of 
Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee, which perhaps surprisingly until the 
1998 peace settlement simply did not touch anything to do with security. It held inquiries on 
many other policy areas, including health, agriculture, social security, transport and 
employment. This could be seen as the classic form of security-related depoliticisation 
described by the Copenhagen School: security was very much the prerogative of the state and 
too sensitive to be subject to open deliberation by committee. It was only well into the 2000s 
that the Committee began to inquire into security-related issues such as the Omagh bombing 
and the administration of an amnesty for fugitive former terrorists.81 These issues still carried 
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facets of old securitisations such as a struggle with the government over access to intelligence, 
but they were also normalised to the degree that they could finally be discussed in the 
parliamentary arena. This is a case of arena shifting as a form of politicisation, in the sense that 
security issues have entered ‘normal’ parliamentary processes when they were absented before.  
 Conclusion 
The three mini-cases studies highlight different aspects of politicisation that the articles 
in this special issue unpack in further detail. They show that security should not be reduced to 
exceptional, technocratic and/or control politics. They also show that the politicisation of issues 
does not simply take place in an either/or, binary fashion, but that several forms and sequences 
of politicisation of issues can feature across cases, and for reasons that require significant 
further research. This insight means that security is not per se opposed to democratic politics. 
But it does not mean jumping to conclusions that posit that security per se is compatible with 
inclusive and transparent policy-making either, or that politicisation is always the preferred 
option for all groups involved. Politicisation is often ambivalent and can take various forms. 
While the post-Snowden controversy shows how highly publicised events can spark open and 
controversial debates, the case studies on public inclusion and parliamentary committees 
revealed that politicisation can also occur through seemingly more mundane forms of everyday 
politics that feature an – albeit diverse – range of professional politicians, experts and advocacy 
groups. In turn, such forms of ‘normal’ politics might be effective in changing security policies 
and inducing new insights into the policy process, while the Snowden revelations in the long-
run led to rather limited changes in actual surveillance laws and practices. Hence, this special 
issue remains open to the discovery of varied and ambivalent effects in the diverse politics 
around security. 
The six contributions that follow are united by a shared interest in the differentiated 
examination of politicisation processes in the security field, i.e., its conceptual, empirical and 
normative dimensions.  
First, they explore how the concept of politicisation can enrich security analysis by 
moving beyond established concepts, such as securitisation, emancipation or governmentality. 
Structured around the idea of politicisation and its dimensions, they open up new perspectives 





and heuristics on the politics of security. They also emphasise that the politicisation perspective 
needs to be adapted to specific questions and contexts. Some explore how the notion of 
politicisation can be fruitfully linked with further concepts, for example from science and 
technology studies82 or the ‘emotional turn’.83  
Second, the articles offer further empirical examinations of specific processes of 
politicisation in different thematic and geographical contexts, thus catering to a deeper 
understanding of their forms, consequences and involved actors, and when and how they differ. 
To this aim, the contributors study diverse instances of politicisation, ranging from 
parliamentary committees in the UK84 to feminist foreign policy agendas in Sweden85 and 
discussions about Turkey’s entanglement in the Syrian civil war.86 They show that even if in 
many cases harsh security measures remain in place and security elites eventually prevail, this 
should not be confused with a stifling of political processes, which might still evolve in and 
between a broad range of arenas featuring a diversity of actors and arguments. Unpacking these 
and other often overlooked phenomena in the security field is a key benefit of the politicisation 
perspective, and should provoke and open up ground for further research, which is undoubtedly 
needed.  
Third, the contributions demand more nuanced assessments of the normative quality of 
politicisation, for they show that the effects of politicisation should not simply be presumed and 
juxtaposed with the negative effects of security on an idealised version of democratic politics. 
Rather, they show that these linkages need to be studied and evaluated in more context-
dependent ways. For instance, it is seen that human rights advocacy groups might use the 
international level to constrain national counterterrorism policies,87 or that politicisation 
ambivalently affects debates about data protection and privacy rights.88 However, the 
contributions also draw attention to cases in which the politicisation of privacy rights eventually 
                                                 
82 Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Matthias Leese, “Politicizing Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance 
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led to harsher encroachments upon these rights,89 or cases in which authorities explicitly tried 
to forestall politicisation by not using security, while societal actors seeking to politicise the 
issue employed a security framing to put responsibility on the government.90 Taken together, 
the six articles thus make sophisticated contributions to the aims of this special issue set out in 
this introduction. Their nuanced analyses help open up an empirically and analytically rich new 
research focus on the politicisation of security, its controversy, patterns of mobilisation, and 
shifting across arenas. In so doing, they also help question and re-visit one of the core concerns 






                                                 
89 Dunn Cavelty and Leese, “Privacy”. 
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